ICS Security Simulator

Ground-truth labelled ICS attack datasets mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS. Build training data for IDS, SIEM, SOC, and red/blue-team exercises without touching a real plant.

How it works

ICS Security runs as an overlay on a Virtual-SCADA simulation. You describe the plant in natural language and flag the attack campaign you want injected. The engine produces the clean-and-attack telemetry side-by-side with ground-truth labels mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS technique ids — the exact data shape IDS / SIEM training pipelines need.

MITRE ATT&CK for ICS v15 coverage

Every injected event carries a first-class v15 technique ID, the tactic chain leading to it, and cross-references to CWE and CAPEC identifiers. Attack graphs are STIX-2.1 shaped. ICS Security v15 additions covered:

T0807 Command-Line Interface
T0814 Denial of Service
T0830 Adversary-in-the-Middle (was: Man-in-the-Middle)
T0831 Manipulation of Control
T0832 Manipulation of View
T0836 Modify Parameter
T0838 Modify Alarm Settings
T0842 Network Sniffing
T0843 Program Download
T0855 Unauthorized Command Message
T0856 Spoof Reporting Message
T0858 Change Operating Mode
T0859 Valid Accounts
T0866 Exploitation of Remote Services
T0869 Standard Application Protocol
T0872 Indicator Removal on Host
T0878 Alarm Suppression
T0881 Service Stop
T0883 Internet Accessible Device
T0889 Modify Program

Stage-2 bundle additions

Alongside the classic seven artefacts, Stage-2 / Stage-2.1 runs ship several additional sealed deliverables:

privacy_evidence.json — source_provenance, ε/δ budget ledger, DP mechanism, per-site receipts (federated runs only).
baseline_detector_receipt.json — hash-pinned IsolationForest fit (training rows SHA, estimator params, feature names, tree thresholds SHA). Consumers re-fit deterministically from the receipt alone.
federation_receipts.json (federated only) — per-site DPHE receipts + aggregated summary + aggregation backend (mpc_additive_v1, tee_sgx_v1, trusted_v1).
unknown_physics_composition.json— composer output when the plant doesn't match a Tier-1/Tier-2 archetype. Includes the species graph, mass-balance invariants, and any DimensionChecker violations surfaced during composition.

Live attack streaming

Attack events stream over the same SSE endpoint as benign telemetry: GET /v1/client/runs/{run_id}/stream. Attack-window slices are also written to a traffic.pcapng segment index in the sealed bundle. Every injected event is Merkle-chained into a hash-chained operator journal — re-ordering, insertion, or deletion breaks the chain.

Deep-dive references

MITRE ATT&CK ICS techniques — every technique the platform supports, grouped by the effect on the control loop (write-side manipulation vs read-side manipulation) and supply chain.
Bundle contents — the labelled artifacts (scada_telemetry, commands, alarms, ics_security, traffic_pcapng) the customer receives.
Validation Gate — the four-dimensional gate specifically penalises attack runs that produce zero anomaly labels.

Quickstart

from radmah_sdk import RadMah

sdk = RadMah(api_key="...", base_url="https://api.radmah.ai")

job = sdk.jobs.create(
    kind="simulate",
    engine="virtual_scada",
    seed=42,
    options={
        "description": (
            "Hospital HVAC plant with one chiller, two AHUs, three zone "
            "valves. Spoof a zone-temperature sensor (T0856)."
        ),
        "total_seconds": 120,
        "protocols": ["bacnet", "modbus"],
        "ics_security_enabled": True,
    },
)